SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN THIRD CIRCUIT LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent United States Court of Appeals for The Third Circuit cases of
interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope to assist the legal
community in keeping abreast of some of the more interesting changes in
significant areas of practice.
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CRIMINAL LAW
FROM

DRUG

SENTENCING POST-ARREST SEPARATION
ADDICTION IMPROPER BASIS FOR DEPARTURE

FROM SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN NON-DRUG

RELATED OF-

FENSE.-United States v. Pharr, 916 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1990).
In 1989, appellee Stanley Pharr (Pharr) agreed to plead
guilty to possession of stolen mail and to sale of stolen United
States Treasury checks in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 1708
(1969) and 18 U.S.C. § 51((b) (Supp. 1988) respectively. Pharr,
916 F.2d at 130. Pharr entered a guilty plea on October 18, 1989
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. Pharr confessed to being a heroin addict and asserted that his addiction prompted the sale of stolen checks.
Thereafter, Pharr voluntarily engaged in and completed a drug
rehabilitation program.
Pursuant to a plea agreement the United States agreed to a
two point reduction in offense level applicable under the United
States Sentencing Commission Guidelines (Guidelines). Pharr
merited the downward adjustment, the government stipulated,
because of his "acceptance of responsibility" as provided under
Guidelines section 3E 1.1. Pharr's acceptance of responsibility included providing the United States information concerning his
participation, as well as the identification of another person involved in the crimes. The probation department, concurring in
the reduction, determined that Pharr's offense level was seven.
Under the Guidelines, the applicable sentence for a level seven
offense, considering Pharr's criminal history, was fifteen to
twenty-one months incarceration.
The district court, finding that Pharr's participation in the
drug rehabilitation program represented a conscientious effort to
overcome his drug addiction, concluded that incarceration would
interrupt Pharr's drug rehabilitation. Id. Further, the district
court found that neither a defendant's attempt to conquer his
drug addiction, nor the disruptive effect that imprisonment
might have on such attempts, were adequately considered by the
United States Sentencing Commission (Sentencing Commission)
in promulgating the Guidelines. Id. The district court concluded
that these factors merited a downward departure from the applicable sentence range. Id. Accordingly, Pharr was sentenced to
five years probation for each count, plus fines and restitution. Id.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit determined that separation from drug addiction was an
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improper basis to depart from the Guidelines. Id. at 131. Consequently, the appellate court reversed and remanded for sentencing in conformance with the Guidelines. Id. at 130.
Writing for the panel, Circuit Judge Cowen began the analysis by observing that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Act)
permits a sentencing judge, in his discretion, to deviate from the
appropriate sentence if the judge finds that a type, or degree, of
mitigating or aggravating circumstance exists which was "not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission
in formulating the [G]uidelines .

. . ."

Pharr, 916 F.2d at 131

(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). The United States argued, the circuit judge summarized, that the district judge's departure from
the Guidelines was error both because Pharr had already received a sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility and
because separation from drug addiction was an improper basis
for deviation. Id. at 131. The Third Circuit instructed that, because determining whether a factor was properly considered by
the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines and
whether such a factor merited a departure as permitted under the
Act were questions of law, the panel's review would be plenary.
Id. (citations omitted).
Next, the court of appeals turned to the United States first
allegation of error: departure was improper because Pharr had
previously received an acceptance of responsibility reduction. Id.
The panel noted that the Guidelines allow a two point reduction
in offense level if a defendant "clearly demonstrates" an acknowledgement and acceptance of "personal responsibility for his
criminal conduct." Id. (quoting Guidelines section 3E 1.1). Circuit
Judge Cowen observed that to qualify for the reduction a defendant typically must either voluntarily acknowledge responsibility
for the crime or mitigate the effects of the crime. Id. In contrast,
the appellate court noted that Pharr's attempted separation from
drug addiction was not acceptance of responsibility. Id.
By entering the rehabilitation program, the Third Circuit
emphasized, Pharr was not recognizing culpability for his crimes
or seeking to lessen the harm resulting from the crimes. Id.
Rather, the panel instructed that Pharr was striving to improve
himself, which conduct was not "contemplated by the acceptance
of responsibility provisions of the [G]uidelines." Id. Accordingly, the appellate panel held that the district court was not
barred from deviating from the Guidelines because Pharr had received the reduction for conduct other than his drug rehabilita-
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tion efforts. Id. In so ruling, the court of appeals distinguished a
Fourth Circuit decision relied upon by the United States. Id. at
131-32 (citing United States v. Van Dyke, 895 F.2d 984 (4th Cir.
1990)).
Circuit Judge Cowen observed that Van Dyke held that drug
rehabilitation efforts could not prompt a departure when a defendant is convicted of a drug related offense. Id. at 131. The
Fourth Circuit reasoned, the Pharr panel noted, that such efforts
would inherently be considered in the acceptance of responsibility determination. Id. at 131-32. The Circuit Judge stressed that
attempted drug rehabilitation was "directly related" to drug trafficking offenses. Id. at 132. Dismissing Pharr's allegation that his
drug addiction compelled Pharr to commit the crimes, the court
of appeals noted that Pharr was not ultimately sentenced for a
drug related offense. Id. Thus, the Third Circuit found Van Dyke
inapplicable. Id. In dicta, the panel refused to consider whether
drug rehabilitation efforts alone would qualify for acceptance of
responsibility in the absence of a ripe controversy. Id.
Having determined that the district court was not barred
from departing from the Guidelines, the Third Circuit turned to
the question of whether Pharr's post-arrest attempt to separate
himself from heroin addiction was an appropriate basis for deviation under the Act. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). Although
commending Pharr's rehabilitation efforts, Circuit Judge Cowen
answered that the objectives of the Guidelines compelled holding
that separation from drug addiction was not an appropriate basis
for a downward departure. Id. The panel thus expressly disagreed with decisions of the Sixth Circuit and three district
courts. Id. at 132 n.4 (citing United States v. Maddalena, 893 F.2d
815 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Harrington, 1990 W.L. 97816
(D.D.C. 1990); United States v. Floyd, 738 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Minn.
1990); United States v. Rodriquez, 725 F. Supp. 1118 (S.D.N.Y.
1989)).
The Pharr panel recognized that Congress' aim in authorizing the Guidelines was to convert the penological system from a
rehabilitation oriented system to one that would impose uniform,
fair punishments. Id. at 132 (citing United States v. Mejia-Orosco,
867 F.2d 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3257
(1989)). Indeed, the court of appeals acknowledged, Congress
expressly mandated that the Guidelines reflect that it is generally
inappropriate for personal characteristics to affect the sentence
imposed. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (Supp. 1990)). Accord-
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ingly, the Third Circuit panel posited that a district court must
limit its exercise of discretion regardless of whether the sentencing judge concurred with Congress' penological objectives. Id.
(citations omitted).
Circuit Judge Cowen emphasized that Congress did not
completely prohibit the exercise of discretion, instructing a sentencing court to consider "the history and characteristics of the
defendant" as well as the nature of the crime. Id. (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)). The Pharrpanel cautioned that such discretion was limited, however, by Congress direction that the Sentencing Commission decide which personal characteristics were
to be considered by the district court. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(d)). The Sentencing Commission responded, the Third
Circuit noted, by including only characteristics relating to a defendant's criminal propensities in an effort to further the congressional goal of punishments tailored to the crime. Id. at 13233 (citation omitted). Consequently, the court of appeals observed that inherently personal conditions, including emotional
or mental characteristics, were not to be considered by a sentencing court. Id. at 133.
The panel was guided by a policy statement of the Sentencing Commission which provided that drug addiction was not a
basis for departing from the Guidelines. Id. (quoting Guidelines
section 5H1.4). Circuit Judge Cowen concluded that neither
drug dependence nor separation therefrom merited a downward
deviation from the appropriate sentence. Id. The Circuit Judge
opined that allowing drug rehabilitation to affect the sentence
would ultimately reward addicts for their dependence upon
drugs, as they would be the only offenders qualifying for such a
downward departure. Id.
Finally, the Pharr panel noted that the Sentencing Commission had repudiated a defendant's attempts at self-improvement
through education or steady employment as a potential basis for
deviation from the Guidelines. Id. (citations omitted). Finding a
sufficient analogy between these efforts and Pharr's drug rehabilitation, the appellate panel held that the district court had erroneously departed from the appropriate Guidelines' sentence. Id.
Additionally, Circuit Judge Cowen summarily concluded that the
potentially disruptive effect imprisonment might have on a defendant's rehabilitation was not a proper basis for a downward
departure. Id. Permitting such a consideration would undermine
the objectives of the Guidelines, posited the circuit court, which
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embodied a move away from a rehabilitative penological system.
Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Third Circuit panel reversed the sentence of the district court, and remanded for sentencing in accordance with the Guidelines. Id. at 130.
The decision of the Third Circuit in Pharr demonstrates that
the judicial branch will show the proper respect for the representative branches of government. Indeed, the well reasoned opinion of Circuit Judge Cowen properly advances Congress' desire
to abandon a rehabilitative system of punishment. The resulting
conflict between the circuits is an unavoidable consequence,
which will hopefully be resolved by the United States Supreme
Court to prevent another evil identified by Congress: disparate
sentences. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(l)(B) (Guidelines should avoid
disparities in sentences among defendants guilty of similar
crimes). Ideally, those same representative branches should decide if the "War on Drugs" would be furthered by permitting
someone like Stanley Pharr to benefit from his efforts to quell the
driving force of his criminal propensities.
Paul G. Gizzi

BANKRUPTCY LAW-Appellate Procedure-Bankruptcy Court
Order Denying a Creditor's Motion to Dismiss Debtor's Petition in Bankruptcy for Bad Faith Held Final Appealable Order.-In Re Rosemary Brown, 916 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1990).
In 1985, Repro Supply Corporation (Repro) obtained a line
of credit, secured by its inventory, receivables and equipment,
from First Jersey National Bank (First Jersey). 916 F.2d at 121.
Repro continued to draw from that line of credit and by October
of 1986 had exceeded its credit limit. At that time, First Jersey
moved to withhold additional advances from the line of credit.
One month later, in November of 1986, Repro filed a petition
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978. Repro remained in business as a debtor in possession.
Subsequent to filing, First Jersey agreed to provide Repro
with additional financing in return for mortgages on three
properties owned by Repro's owners (Rosemary and Gary
Brown). The bankruptcy court authorized this arrangement and
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the mortgages were executed and delivered to First Jersey. Ultimately, Repro's attempted reorganization failed and the bankruptcy court ordered First Jersey to liquidate Repro's assets.
First Jersey petitioned the state court to foreclose on the mortgaged properties after the liquidation failed to satisfy the post
petition claim. The Browns contested the foreclosure action but
the state court granted summary judgment for First Jersey and
permitted it to proceed with the foreclosure. Additionally, the
state court granted the Brown's request for a hearing to determine the amount due on the mortgages. In the interim, however,
Rosemary Brown filed her own Chapter 11 petition. First Jersey
moved for dismissal of Ms. Brown's petition alleging that the petition was a bad faith attempt to frustrate the foreclosure proceedings. Id. at 121-22 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (b)).
The bankruptcy court denied First Jersey's motion explaining that even though the petition was filed during the pendency
of the foreclosure action, "it would be premature to conclude
that there is no reasonable likelihood of successful reorganization or liquidating plan of reorganization within a reasonable period of time since the case had just commenced." Id. at 122.
First Jersey filed an appeal with the district court seeking reversal of the bankruptcy court's order denying First Jersey's motion to dismiss. Id. The district court did not consider the
merits of the bankruptcy court's order dismissing First Jersey's
motion. Id. Instead, the district court disallowed the appeal,
holding that since Ms. Brown's petition was only recently filed,
the bankruptcy court's order of dismissal was not a final appealable order but rather an interlocutory order that did not preclude
First Jersey from raising the bad faith issue later in the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. The district court found no showing that
FirstJersey would be prejudiced by Ms. Brown's petition and emphasized that as a secured creditor, First Jersey would be adequately protected under the Bankruptcy Code. Id. First Jersey
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Id.
The Third Circuit held that the order of the bankruptcy
court in this case was a final appealable order. Id. (citing 28
U.S.C. § 158(a)). Writing for the court, Justice Greenberg first
reviewed the pertinent statutory material bearing on the case. Id.
The court stated that 28 U.S.C. § 158 (d) grants the court of
appeals jurisdiction overfinal decisions, judgments, decrees and
orders of the district court entered pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
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§ 158(a). In Re Rosemary Brown, 916 F.2d at 122. Moreover, the
court explained that 28 U.S.C. § 158 (a) grants the district court
jurisdiction over "finaljudgments, orders and decrees, and, with leave
of the court, from interlocutory orders and decrees of bankruptcy
judges entered in cases and proceedings referred to the bankruptcy judges.... ." In re Rosemary Brown, 916 F.2d at 122 (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 157)(emphasis added).
Working within this statutory framework, Justice Greenberg
addressed the question of whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction over the district court's order in this case. Id. After reviewing a series of Third Circuit cases discussing the jurisdiction
question, Justice Greenberg concluded that the district court's
order dismissing First Jersey's motion to dismiss the Brown's
Chapter 11 proceeding was final and that the court of appeals
had jurisdiction on appeal. Id. at 123.
Citing a 1986 Third Circuit decision, Justice Greenberg
maintained that the question of finality should be approached
"pragmatically, looking at the effect of the district court's ruling." Id. (quoting In re Christian, 804 F.2d 46, 47-48 (3rd Cir.
1986)). In In re Christian, the Third Circuit held that an order of
the district court affirming the bankruptcy court's denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss was final. Id. (citing In re Christian, 804
F.2d 46 (3rd Cir. 1986)). Justice Greenberg quoted from the
Third Circuit Opinion in Christian:
If the order [in Christian] is not now appealable the entire
bankruptcy proceedings must be completed before it can be
determined whether they were proper in the first place. we do
not view such a resolution as either desirable or practical. In
light of Marin Motor Oil and Comer .... we therefore conclude
that the district court's order in this case is a final order under
§ 158(d). Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction to consider
the Bank's appeal.
Id. (quoting In re Christian, 804 F.2d 46, 48 (3rd Cir. 1986)).
Respondents argued that Christian was distinguishable because
Christian addressed the standing of petitioners to make a motion to
dismiss in the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. Justice Greenberg rejected this argument as irrelevant to the question of finality. Id. Justice Greenberg explained that in both this case and Christian, the
bankruptcy court rejected a motion to dismiss which the district
court upheld. Id. Justice Greenberg noted that even though the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order in Christian instead
of denying the right to appeal, as it did in this case, the pragmatic
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effects of the district court's action in both cases were the same: the
bankruptcy proceeding continued. Id.
In keeping with the court's pragmatic approach to finality, Justice Greenberg rejected the Respondent's argument that the reasons for the district court's order should be germane to the question
of finality. Id. Justice Greenberg argued that, according to Christian,
the only relevant consideration is the practical effect that the district
court's order has on the dispute. Id. at 124. (citing In re Taylor, 913
F.2d 102 (3rd Cir. 1990)). In In re Taylor, the Third Circuit maintained jurisdiction over a district court order that affirmed a bankruptcy court order denying a motion to dismiss a Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceeding. Id. (citing In re Taylor, 913 F.2d 102 (3rd
Cir. 1990)). Justice Greenberg interpreted Taylor as suggesting that
the reasons behind an order were irrelevant to any determination of
the order's finality. Id. (citing In re Taylor, 913 F.2d at 102).
Justice Greenberg continued his analysis by noting that under
the applicable statute a court of appeals could characterize a district
court order as final even though the district court's jurisdiction derived from an interlocutory order of the bankruptcy court. Id. (citing
28 U.S.C. § 158(d)). Justice Greenberg maintained that the statute
would preclude the court of appeals from exercising jurisdiction
over this type of order because when a district court affirms a bankruptcy court's interlocutory order (which did not occur in this case),
"a subsequent appeal to the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals will not then be
permitted." Id. (quoting In re West Electronics, 852 F.2d 79, 82 (3rd
Cir. 1988)). Justice Greenberg decided that this statement effectively limits the jurisdiction of the court of appeals to only 'final orders and judgments of the [b]ankruptcy [c]ourts and the [d]istrict
[c]ourts." Id. (quoting In re White Beauty View, Inc., 841 F.2d 524, 525
(3rd Cir. 1988)) (emphasis added).
Before remanding the case for consideration of First Jersey's
appeal on the merits, Justice Greenberg noted that there were several decisions handed down by other courts of appeals which supported the district court's conclusions. Id. The court, however,
declined to follow these cases and chose to follow Christianand Taylor that "an order denying a motion to dismiss a Chapter 11 proceeding for bad faith is a final and appealable order within [the
statute]." Id.
Any analysis of a bankruptcy dispute should keep in mind the
basic equitable policies behind bankruptcy: protection of creditor's
rights and providing the debtor with a fresh start. The Third Circuit
in this case balances the right of FirstJersey (the creditor) and Rose-
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mary Brown (the debtor) and finds that the scales tip in favor of
First Jersey. The Third Circuit's decision requires that the bad faith
determination be concluded before the debtor is permitted full relief
under the Bankruptcy Code. At first glance, this decision appears to
contribute to delay in the disposition of the debtor's bankruptcy petition. Further analysis of the Court's reasoning however, displays
an equitable awareness that the creditor has a right to full determination of the bad faith question before the debtor can bring the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to bear on the creditor's right to
foreclosure.
Continued access to the Bankruptcy proceeding by the debtor
would normally prevent the creditor from exercising his/her right to
foreclosure until after the bankruptcy process was completed.
Under the factual situation set forth in this case, preventing the
creditor from exercising its right of foreclosure even thought the
question of bad faith remains in doubt would appear to be unfair to
the creditor and counterproductive to the principles of bankruptcy.
As indicated in the Christian decision, if the Court decided not to
hear the appeal, the creditor would have to wait until the bankruptcy
proceeding was concluded before a determination on the bad faith
issue could be made. In re Christian, 804 F.2d 46 (3rd Cir. 1986).
This scenario, if bad faith actually existed, would appear to be
wasteful and would prevent the creditor from obtaining the benefit
of his bargain in a timely manner. Therefore, it seems apparent that
the Third Circuit decision in In re Rosemary Brown (that a bankruptcy
court order denying a motion to dismiss a Chapter 11 proceeding in
bad faith is a final appealable order), despite contrary decisions in
other circuits, provides a pragmatic, efficient and equitable solution
to the problems of appellate review of these bad faith motions.
Matthew C. Campbell

CIVIL PROCEDURE-Jurisdiction-District Court Lacks Authority to Transfer a Matter Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)
ON THE BASIS OF LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION.--Carteret Savings Bank v. Shushan,

919 F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1990).
Carteret Savings Bank, primarily located in New Jersey, filed
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a diversity action against a law firm and some of its individual
members (hereinafter known compositely as Shushan) in the District of New Jersey. 919 F.2d at 226. Carteret sought recovery
for breach of fiduciary duty stemming from Shushan's alleged
failure to protect Carteret's interest in a Louisiana loan transaction, which resulted in a $1,500,000 judgment against Carteret.
Shushan, in turn, brought a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. At the hearing, the district court refrained
from reaching the merits of the case and, instead, solicited Shushan to seek a venue transfer to Louisiana, where Shushan had
conducted the majority of its actions concerning the loan transaction. Id. at 226-27. Accordingly, Shushan motioned for a transfer of venue, but "still primarily sought to have the complaint
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction." Id. at 227. Although
Shushan's motion failed to set-forth the statutory basis for the
transfer, at a hearing on the motion Shushan contended thatforum non conveniens justified the transfer. Id.

Subsequently, the district court concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Shushan (but did not dismiss on that basis) and transferred the matter to the Eastern District of
Louisiana. Id. Carteret promptly brought a motion for reargument or, alternatively, either to delete the portion of the order
transferring venue or to have the matter certified for immediate
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Id. The district court
concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Shushan and
determined that section 1406(a) "[vested the] [c]ourt with sufficient power to transfer [the] case, whether venue [was] characterized as correct or incorrect under [section] 1391(a)." Carteret,
919 F.2d at 227 (quoting Carteret v. Shushan, 721 F. Supp 705,709

(D.N.J. 1989)). Carteret appealed the district court order and
filed a petition for mandamus. Id. at 228. The petition requested
reversal of the venue transfer and of the district court's determination that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Shushan. Id. In
response, Shushan opposed the mandamus petition and motioned to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, and partially granted the mandamus petition, limited to vacating the
venue transfer. Id.
Writing for the court, Judge Greenberg relied on the general
rule that orders transferring venue are not appealable. Id.
Therefore, the court reasoned, because the district court did not

500

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 21:490

certify the case under section 1292(b), the Third Circuit only can
assume appellate jurisdiction over the appeal through an exception to the general rule. Id.
In analyzing the proffered exceptions, the Third Circuit rejected Carteret's contention that when a district court concludes
it lacks personal jurisdiction over a party, that order is final irrespective of its other provisions. Id. at 229. The Third Circuit
reasoned that the district court never disposed of the personal
jurisdiction issue; rather, the district court merely transferred the
matter to another venue. Id. Moreover, noted Judge Greenberg,
the district court did not terminate the matter "throughout the
entire federal system." Id.
Judge Greenberg also rejected Carteret's reliance on Reuber
v. United States, 773 F. 2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1985), as supporting
appellate jurisdiction over its appeal. Carteret, 919 F.2d at 229.
The Third Circuit factually distinguished Reuber because, there,
the district court dismissed a single defendant for lack of personal jurisdiction while transferring the remaining litigants to the
District of Maryland. Id. Accordingly, the court reasoned that
the dismissal of the single defendant in Reuber was a final appealable order, while in the instant case the district court did not dismiss "anybody or anything" and therefore its order was not
immediately appealable. Id. at 229-30.
Then, the Third Circuit repudiated Carteret's reliance on
Bradshaw v. General Motors Corp 805 F. 2d 110 (3rd. Cir. 1986) for
its proposition that a "ruling of a district court finding no personal jurisdiction over all defendants is typically appealable
under 28 U.S.C. 1291." Carteret,919 F.2d at 230. Though agreeing with the proposition, the court evinced that the proposition is
limited to instances when the district court dismisses the case. Id.
Whereas, in this case, the district court merely transferred venue
and did not dismiss "anybody or anything." Id.
Further, the court summarily rejected Carteret's reliance on
the collateral order doctrine as supporting appellate jurisdiction.
Id. In doing so, the court reasoned that according to its decision
in Nascone v. Spudnuts, Inc., 735 F. 2d 763, 772-73 (3d Cir. 1974),
orders concerning transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or
§ 1406(a) are not appealable, and that this conclusion holds true
irrespective of the reasons for the transfer. Carteret, 919 F.2d at
230.
Finally, the court rejected Carteret's contention that, since
the district court premised the transfer on lack of personal juris-
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diction, this case is distinguishable under the collateral order
doctrine from transfer based on other reasons. Id. The court
reasoned that by analogy, Van Cauweberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517
militates against Carteret's contention. Carteret, 919 F.2d at 230.
Specifically, the court acknowledged that Van Cauweberghe indicated that an order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is not an appealable collateral order because
the defendant still can seek appellate review after entry of a final
order. Id. From that concept, the court determined that such a
defendant's need for immediate review is "qualitatively" greater
than Carteret's need for immediate review, because such a defendant's need is based upon due process while Carteret's need
is based merely upon choice of forum. Id. Accordingly, the court
implicitly concluded that Carteret's appeal lacked one of the requirements for collateral finality: that the right involved be "too
important to be denied review." Id. Therefore, the court held
that the collateral order doctrine did not apply and dismissed the
appeal. Id.
Immediately following its dismissal of the appeal, the court's
opinion set-forth the reasoning for its partial grant of Carteret's
petition for mandamus. Id. The court propounded that Carteret's petition raised two questions concerning section 1406(a):
one, whether it applies when venue is proper; and two, whether it
may be invoked over the plaintiff's objections. Id. at 230-31.
The court concluded that, regardless of section 1406(a)'s scope,
the district court's transfer was clear error because it ignored
Carteret's objection. Id. at 231. As a result, the court concluded
that a writ of mandamus should issue to annul the district court's
transfer order. Id.
The court stated that it would explain, but not determine,
whether section 1406(a) applies when venue is proper. Id. The
court indicated that this is a novel question in the circuit, but that
other circuit courts have permitted section 1406(a) transfers
when venue was proper in the district court. Id. The Third Circuit noted that these courts relied on Goldwar v. Hetman, 369 U.S.
462, 82 S.Ct 913 (1962) even though in Goldwar venue, not personal jurisdiction, was mislaid. Carteret, 919 F.2d at 231. The
court determined, as indicated in Porter v. Groat, 840 F. 2d 255
(4th Cir. 1988), that "only a broad construction of section
1406(a) can justify transfer when venue is proper." Carteret, 919
F.2d at 231.
Consequently, the court distinguished the cases permitting
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1406(a) transfers when venue was proper from the instant case.
Id. Specifically, the court observed that in those cases permitting
1406(a) transfer when venue was proper the plaintiff sought the
transfer, while in the instant case the plaintiff, Carteret, objected
to the transfer and wanted as its remedy appellate review of the
district court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id.
This distinction, the court asserted; is "outcome determinative." Id. The court reasoned that the expansive construction of
section 1406(a) has been adopted as an equitable remedy to prevent termination of claims whose merits have not been reached.
Id. Such remedies, the court noted, especially have been granted
when a plaintiff, though having properly laid venue, would not be
able to proceed in the transferor court because of jurisdictional
defects. Id. at 231-32. In addition, the court found no authority
that would compel a plaintiff who properly laid venue to accept a
section 1406(a) transfer. Id. at 232.
The court analogized the instant situation to when a court
dismisses a complaint for failure to state a claim and grants the
plaintiff leave to amend. Id. Such a plaintiff, the court noted, can
amend his complaint and seek appellate review of the dismissal,
assuming there had been one. Id. Therefore, the court reasoned
that Carteret, like the plaintiff with leave to amend, should not be
forced to accept an unwanted remedy and consequently forfeit its
chance to appeal the jurisdictional ruling. Id. In short, the court
held that the district court exceeded its authority by compelling
Carteret to accept the transfer. Id.
In dicta, the court recognized that "the interests of persons
not controlling the litigation might be implicated in a plaintiff's
decision to refuse a transfer." Id. Therefore, the court noted, in
some situations a court might be justified in compelling an adverse plaintiff to accept transfer, especially when failure to transfer might result in dismissal of a matter which would be time
barred in another district. Id. The court, however, affirmed that
this case did not implicate any such interest. Id.
Next, the court acknowledged that the mere fact the district
court erred does not require a writ of mandamus. Id. Accordingly, the court set-forth the criteria for granting a writ of mandamus: (1) the decision is discretionary; (2) the writ should issue
only in exceptional circumstances and only if the party seeking
the writ shows "its right to the writ is clear and indisputable;" (3)
the clear error should minimally resemble "an unauthorized exercise of judicial power; and (4) the party seeking the writ must
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have no other adequate remedy to attain the desired relief. Id. at
232-33.
Finding sufficient reasons to issue the writ, the court held
that the "district court could not transfer the case ...

over Car-

teret's objection." Id. at 233. The court reasoned that the district court had no authority to transfer the matter and therefore
the transfer "approached the magnitude of an unauthorized exercise of judicial authority." Id. Furthermore, the court reasoned that its declining to issue the mandamus writ would leave
Carteret without "other adequate means to avoid the transfer."
Id.
The court then quickly rejected the portion of Carteret's petition which sought reversal of the district court's jurisdictional
finding. Id. The court declared that the writ's effect was limited
to the annulment of the transfer. Id. Accordingly, the court postulated two possibilities for the case on remand: dismissal for lack
of personal jurisdiction, or grant of Shushan's motion for a section 1404(a) transfer. Id. The court, moreover, refrained from
indicating whether a section 1404(a) transfer would be permissible. Id. at 233 n.16. Finally, the court declared that each party
should "bear its own costs." Id. at 233.
Circuit Judge Seitz concurred in the dismissal of Carteret's
appeal, but dissented from the issuance of the writ of mandamus.
Id. (Seitz, J. dissenting). Judge Seitz asserted that section
1406(a)'s plain language fails to justify the majority's conclusion
that the district court exceeded its authority by transferring the
case over Carteret's objection. Id. at 234. Moreover, Judge Seitz
noted that other district courts have transferred cases under section 1406(a) over a plaintiff's objection. Id. See Gulf Research &
Dev. Co, v. Harrison, 185 F. 2d 457, 459-60 (9th Cir. 1950); Bankers
Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382 (1953). In short,
the judge saw no "principled distinction, for mandamus purposes, between objections to venue and personal jurisdiction."
Id. at 234.
Furthermore, Judge Seitz criticized the majority's conclusion
that without mandamus Carteret would have no "other means to
avoid the transfer." Id. The judge reasoned that Carteret might
have had "other means to avoid transfer" if it could have obtained appellate review over the 1406(a) transfer in the Fifth Circuit; therefore, the determinative issue was whether such
appellate review could have been available. Id. Additionally, the
judge noted that a writ of mandamus should not issue solely be-
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cause a transfer might impose hardship and inconvenience upon
the plaintiff. Id. Therefore, Judge Seitz disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the district court lacked authority to
transfer the case over the plaintiff's objections. Id.
As a separate issue, Judge Seitz addressed Carteret's contention that section 1406(a) applies only to mislaid venue but not to
lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. Judge Seitz agreed with the line
of cases cited by the majority that permitted 1406(a) transfers
based on lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. In support of his conclusion, the judge referred to the principle that according to section 1406(a), "wrong division or district" includes any
"impediment to a decision on the merits," including impediments other than improper venue. Id. at 234-35 (quoting Porter
v. Groat, 840 F. 2d 255 (4th Cir. 1988). Judge Seitz concluded
that, despite proper venue, the district court had "statutory authority to transfer the case." Id. at 235.
Two peculiar actions generated this legal quandary: the district court's unique request that the defendant, Shushan, bring a
motion for a venue transfer; and the plaintiff's desire to have the
Third Circuit resolve the personal jurisdiction issue despite the
possibility that an adverse ruling could terminate its claim
throughout the federal court system. Generally, 1406(a) transfers are sought not by defendants, but by plaintiffs whose claims
face potential extinction upon dismissal. In contrast, in Carteret v.
Shushan, the plaintiff opposed the venue transfer. Additionally,
the defendant, Shushan, should not have wanted a transfer of
venue because the transfer would permit the plaintiff to continue
the claim, while a dismissal might terminate the plaintiff's action
due to jurisdictional defects in other forums. Shushan, however,
complied with the district court's solicitation apparently to avoid
antagonizing the court.
Carteret's desire to have the Third Circuit resolve the personal jurisdiction issue can be construed as peculiar because, in
essence, the plaintiff risked termination of a potentially large recovery: $1,500,000 plus pre-judgment interest. Carteret's desire,
though seemingly bold, may be explained if Carteret resolutely
believed that it would succeed in obtaining personal jurisdiction
over Shushan in New Jersey. Moreover, if Carteret succeeded in
revoking the transfer, it would avoid the inconvenience and increased cost of litigating in a Louisiana district court. Carteret,
additionally, would avoid awaiting the resolution of that trial to
appeal the New Jersey district court's transfer order and its per-
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sonal jurisdiction ruling. Also, Carteret's desire is substantiated
because the Fifth Circuit might have been hesitant to overrule
the New Jersey district court's personal jurisdiction ruling, for
then the Fifth Circuit would have to transfer the matter back to
New Jersey and the process would begin anew.
The New Jersey district court's unique 1406(a) transfer
might have made been more sense if the plaintiff had sought the
transfer or if it was originally based on 1404(a). Unfortunately,
the district court adequately did not address its solicitation of the
venue transfer nor the plaintiff's peculiar desire for a New Jersey
federal court to resolve the jurisdictional issue.
The district court's reasoning, moreover, exacerbated this
legal quandary. Specifically, the district court reasoned, as noted
by the Third Circuit, that section 1406(a) permitted the transfer
of the case on the basis that "(a) litigant who has commenced a
timely action within the federal system should not be penalized
with the loss of the cause of action solely because he has made
the reasonable error as to the existence of (personal jurisdiction)." Carteret Savings Bank v. Shushan, 721 F. Supp 705, 710
(D.N.J. 1989). This reasoning supports a plaintiff who wants to
transfer a matter to avoid termination of his cause of action. In
this case, however, the plaintiff challenged, instead of sought, the
transfer. To the district court's credit, the United States
Supreme Court interpreted 1406(a) in Goldwar, Inc. v. Heiman,
369 U.S. 463, to show that 1406(a) covers more than venue defects and should be applied broadly. The problem, though, is
that plaintiffs generally are considered masters of their claimsin that they should determine their forum provided they meet the
jurisdictional requirements of personal jurisdiction and venue.
The district court's solicitation, therefore, mutated the case.
The mutation, however, may be aggravated if, on remand, the
district court follows the second route suggested by the Third
Circuit: granting Shushan's motion for a section 1404(a) transfer.
Such a result would avoid the appellate resolution of the personal jurisdiction issue until after a Louisiana district court decision. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit might be less inclined to
overrule the New Jersey District Court's personal jurisdiction decision because it would then have to transfer the case back to
New Jersey.
The district court, in contrast, more appropriately should
follow suggested route one: dismissal of the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. A dismissal apparently would satisfy both par-
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ties. Carteret could then appeal the dismissal as a final order,
and Shushan could await appellate review to determine whether
it is amenable to suit in New Jersey. Additionally, that result
would not prejudice Carteret because it desired that result, and
there are few, if any, credible arguments as to why it might prejudice Shushan.
In contrast, the argument that a 1404(a) transfer should be
preferred to a dismissal is plausible. Its plausibility arises because 1404(a) authorizes a transfer "(f)or the convenience of the
parties and witness, in the interests of justice," and because in
the case a large portion of the witness and evidence are in Louisiana. This argument, however, collides with the words "in the interest of justice," assuming "the interests of justice" extend to
efficient and economical resolution of disputes. Specifically,
since a 1404(a) transfer would result in a Louisiana district court
being forced to digest the case and the possibility that the Fifth
Circuit could reverse the personal jurisdiction ruling, a 1404(a)
transfer could, by repetition, waste judicial resources.
Therefore, the interest of Carteret, Shushan, and judicial
economy compel that the district court dismiss the matter and
permit the Third Circuit to resolve the personal jurisdiction dispute. Moreover, the dispute, when stripped to the bone, is
whether Shushan is subject to personal jurisdiction in New
Jersey. Consequently, it is unfortunate that without conclusively
reaching its merits, a personal jurisdiction issue has generated
such voluminous litigation, in the light of the dearth of judicial
resources.
Elliot N. Turrini

EVIDENCE-Expert Testimony-Rule 702 Employed To Evaluate Admissibility of Expert's Conclusion In Benedectin Litigation-DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d
941 (3rd Cir. 1990).
The DeLucas, the parents of Amy DeLuca, sought to recover
damages from Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Corporation (Merrell Dow), the manufacturer of Bendectin, for their daughter's
severe birth defects. 911 F.2d at 942-43. The DeLucas con-
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tended that Cindy Deluca's ingestion of the drug Bendectin during her pregnancy caused their child's birth defects, limb
reduction of the lower extremities. The DeLucas submitted the
affidavits and depositions of a well-established pediatric pharmacologist, Dr. Alan Done, to establish that existing epidemiological information demonstrates that Bendectin is a teratogen, an
agent which causes birth defects. Furthermore, Dr. Done averred
to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Bendectin, prescribed for morning sickness, caused the daughter's defects.
Moving for summary judgment, Merrell Dow contended that the
DeLucas' evidence was inadmissible because no single epidemiological study has ever established with "statistical significance"
that the use of Bendectin during pregnancy causes the type of
birth defects presently afflicting their daughter.
The district court, employing an analysis based on Rule 703
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, excluded Dr. Done's findings
because his data and materials were not "the type reasonably relied upon by experts." Id. at 943. Although the district court recognized that Dr. Done simply reinterpreted data used in
published epedemiological studies, it noted that those authors
derived a different conclusion than Dr. Done. Id. The district
court also admonished Dr. Done for interpreting epidemiological
evidence when he was not an epidemiologist. Id. After finding
that the DeLucas' sole causation evidence was inadmissible, the
lower court granted summary judgment to Merrell Dow. Id. The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded.
Id.
Judge Stapleton, writing for the unanimous panel, began his
analysis by framing the legal and scientific setting. Id. The judge
initially established that hundreds of Bendectin-induced birth defects cases preceded the DeLucas'. Id. The court of appeals acknowledged that Merrell Dow's successful litigation strategy, in
the district court emphasized "the great weight of scientific opinion" in its favor and previous cases where testimony of Bendectin's teratogenic tendencies was held either inadmissable or
insufficient to support a verdict. Id. Judge Stapleton observed
that the lower court primarily surveyed case law rather than developing a record-supported, factual finding that Dr. Done had
relied upon data, which experts in the field deemed unreliable.
Id. at 944.
Also, Judge Stapleton adopted a plenary standard of review
for scrutinizing the lower court's construction of the Federal
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Rules of Evidence. Id. (citations omitted). The court of appeals
then presented the applicable standard to review a final order for
summary judgment. Id. at 945.
Judge Stapleton then introduced the rudimentary principles
of the governing scientific methodology and epidemiology, to
elucidate the problematic nature of causation in Bendectin cases.
Id. Moreover, the court of appeals observed that actual causation
cannot be shown clinically. Id. The court determined that the
DeLucas' opportunity for success in establishing causation depended upon their ability to demonstrate through the use of epidemiological data that Bendectin possibly caused their child's
birth defects. Id. Epidemiological studies, the court explained,
do not provide evidence that a particular plaintiff was injured, the
court explained, rather, these studies, only aspire to generate circumstantial evidence. Id. Judge Stapleton noted that epidemiological study employs the use of two test groups: identical except
for their exposure to the test substance. Id. The court of appeals
stipulated that epidemiologists attempt to disprove the "null"
hypothesis and thereby accept the "alternative" hypothesis to
demonstrate a correlative relationship between the studied variables: birth defects and Bendectin use, in this case. Id. (citations
omitted). The court determined that the null hypothesis represented the contention that no association exists between the
Bendectin and limb reduction defects, while the alternative hypothesis in this case represented the contention that birth defects
correlate with Benedectin use. Id.
Additionally, Judge Stapleton maintained that most epidemiologists, recognizing variances between the general population
and their sample groups, utilize "significance testing" to eliminate the possibility of sampling error. Id. at 946-47. Accordingly,
the court of appeals found that "significance testing" utilizes a "P
value," calibrated to .05, to indicate when the test results are
within an acceptable range of error. Id. at 947. Judge Stapleton
evinced that if a study's finding corroborates the alternative hypotheses within .05 (or five percent) of the P value, the results are
significant. Id. Judge Stapleton also found that every published
study, on the incidence of birth defects and exposure to Bendectin, has concluded that the relationship is not "statistically significant." Id.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals recognized that Dr. Done
relied upon a methodology which places diminished reliance
upon "significance testing." Id. at 946 (citations omitted). This
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view, espoused by Professor Kenneth Rothman, holds that the
null hypothesis, when measured at a .05 significance value, will
be rejected five percent of the time when it is true, while the null
hypothesis will be incorrectly accepted fifty percent of the time.
Id. at 947 (citations omitted). More significantly, Judge Stapleton
then articulated Rothman's belief that, "there is nothing magical
or inherently important about .05 significance. .

.,"

rather it rep-

resents a "conservative and arbitrary value choice" not necessary
in the legal setting. Id. (citations omitted).
Rothman's views, as stated by Judge Stapleton, advocate that
an epidemiologist should employ various confidence levels to determine the true relationship between studied variables. Id. at
947-48. The court of appeals, again presenting Rothman's contentions, acknowledged that significance testing may be especially unhelpful when an epidemiologist is attempting to view
numerous data pools, where each was dismissed as statistically
insignificant although the majority of the data tends to contradict
the null hypothesis. Id. at 948. Further, the court of appeals observed that Dr. Done, applying Rothman's techniques to published and unpublished epidemiological studies, had graphed the
sets of data individually and collectively to reach his conclusion
that, "the bulk of the available human epidemiological data...
[is] indicative of Bendectin's human teratogenicity." Id. at 94849 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, the court of appeals stated
that Dr. Done's suggestion, regarding limb reduction as the
strongest teratogenetic manifestation of Bendectin, was not
quantified, published or subject to peer review. Id.
Next, the court of appeals discussed the history of Bendectin
case law. Id. at 949. The court found that the largest Bendectin
trial involved over 1,000 consolidated cases resulted in a
favorable verdict for Merrell Dow, without the admissibility and
sufficiency of Dr. Done's evidence on causation becoming an issue. Id. (citations omitted). Judge Stapleton reviewed the District of Columbia Court of Appeal's reinstatement of a verdict
against Merrell Dow, after the trial court had granted a j.n.o.v.
due to insufficient causation evidence. Id. (citing Oxendine v. Merrell
Doe Pharmaceutical,Inc., 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1986). The appellate
court, when confronted only with Dr. Done's testimony on causation, recognized that Dr. Done's testimony was "sound," "careful," and "thorough;" and, therefore, Dr. Done's evidence was
sufficient to establish causation. Id. at 949-50 (citing Oxendine, 506
A.2d at 1108-09).
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Judge Stapleton determined that the First and D.C. Circuits
rejected appeals from grants of judgments not withstanding the
verdict and held Dr. Done's testimony was not only insufficient to
support a verdict, but also that it was inadmissible under Rule
703 unless Dr. Done were to base his conclusion on his own epidemiological study and reach a statistically significant conclusion.
Id. at 950 (citations omitted). Judge Stapleton emphasized that
these courts concluded that a new study, reaching a different
conclusion, Would be admissible evidence; but, these courts
urged that an expert, "without such a study," lacks sufficient
grounds upon which to base his opinion regarding Bendectin's
teratogenicity. Id. Judge Stapleton recognized that the Fifth Circuit was disturbed by the chilling effect which potential tort liability would place on researchers and manufacturers if the court
were to permit non-statistically significant epidemiological proof
to sustain jury verdicts. Id. at 950-51 (citations omitted). The
DeLuca court found that the Fifth Circuit, although reversing the
jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, did not exclude the nonstatistically significant data and expert testimony on Bendectin's
teratogenic nature must be excluded. Id. at 951 (citation omitted). Instead, the Fifth Circuit determined that this type of evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict. Id. (citation omitted).
The court of appeals concluded its case law examination by
noting that Judge Rubin, who had presided over the multi-district common issues trial, recently denied Merrell Dow's motion
for summary judgment on the causation issue in a group of consolidated Bendectin cases because he found a division in the scientific community regarding the propriety of non-traditional
epidemiological methods. Id. (citingIn re Bendectin Products Liability
Litigation, 732 F.Supp. 744 (E.D. Mich. 1990)).
Although acknowledging the concerns of the other courts,
Judge Stapleton emphasized that the Federal Rules of Evidence
may not be manipulated to create special rules governing the
problems associated with Bendectin cases. Id. at 952. Additinally, Judge Stapleton set forth the "two-fold" task for a court
in summary judgment proceedings: employ the Federal Rules of
Evidence to scrutinize the admissibility of plaintiff's testimony,
and identify the proper state law standard of causation. Id.
Beginning its instructions on the Federal Rules of Evidence
to the district court, the court of appeals stated that the function
of Rule 703 is to "delimit" reliable bases of expert testimony, as
determined by experts in the field. Id. (citation omitted). The
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majority upbraided the district court for not developing a recordsupported, factual finding for its decision. Id. at 953. The court
of appeals, noting Rule 703's liberalization of the standards for
permissible evidence, criticized the lower court's apparent reliance on Dr. Done's non-epidemiological background in disregarding Dr. Done's analysis, especially because Merrell Dow had
conceded Dr. Done's qualifications for interpreting epidemiological data. Id.
Judge Stapleton then reminded lower courts that Rule 703
does not involve an assessment of an expert's reliability. Id.
Rather, a Rule 703 analysis focuses on the reliability of the data
involved. Id. As Judge Stapleton had bluntly concluded earlier,
an expert's qualifications must be scrutinized under Rule 702,
not 703. Id. The court determined that Rule 703 is satisfied if the
expert uses reasonable data of the type relied upon by qualified
experts. Judge Stapleton reminded the lower court that,
although it may freely reject the reliability of Dr. Done's epidemiological data on remand under Rule 703, the experts testifying
for Merrell Dow employed the same data. Id. The court of appeals specifically rejected the lower court's interest, echoed by
the First and D.C. Circuits, in requiring an expert to accept a
study's conclusions, along with its accompanying data, as a prerequisite to admissibility under Rule 703. Id. at 954. While the
D.C., First, and Fifth Circuits expressed distrust in reinterpretation of published and peer-reviewed studies, the DeLuca court
concluded that the Federal Rules of Evidence recognize no interest in excluding evidence solely because it has not been
grounded in peer-reviewed literature. Id.
Moreover, Judge Stapleton turned his attention to Rule 702
and stated the issue before the lower court: whether "an expert
opinion based on epidemiological data.., is not admissible unless the data will disprove the null hypotheses that Bendectin is
not a teratogen at a .05 level of 'statistical significance.' " Id. The
court of appeals held that this issue of first impression in the
Third Circuit must be evaluated under Rule 702 in accordance
with the principles stated in United States v. Downing. Id. (citing
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir. 1985)). The
DeLuca court, before presenting the Downing test, elaborated that
Rule 702 authorizes admission of expert testimony where the expert is qualified and employs a reliable methodology which helps
the trier of fact. Id. (citations omitted). Judge Stapleton, applying
these principles, expressed that the lower court may give judicial
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notice to Dr. Done's testimony if he uses traditional epidemiological methodology, but the district court must conduct an analysis
for admissibility under Downing to the extent Dr. Done's testimony deviates from traditional methodology. Id.
The court of appeals stated the Downing factors for judicial
inquiry under Rule 702: (1) the reliability of the process involved;
(2) potential for admitted evidence to "overwhelm, confuse, or
mislead the jury;" and (3) the connection between the evidence
presented and the factual issues in the case. Id. at 954-55 (citing
Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237). The court of appeals immediately
recognized that the "fit" between the causation issue and Dr.
Done's testimony "cuts" in favor of admissibility. Id. at 955.
Moreover, the court of appeals, reiterating its previous rejection of the Downing "general acceptance" test, instructed the
lower court that Dr. Done's opinion cannot be excluded solely
because it deviates from mainstream scientific methodology,
although this deviation from a "contrary dominant position" is
not irrelevant for analysis under the first prong of the Downing
test. Id. (citing Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C.Cir.
1923)). The unanimous panel relegated traditional significance
levels, of .05, to only "part of a meaningful evaluation of reliability." Id. Judge Stapleton declared that the ultimate issue is "what
risk... the judicial system is willing to tolerate." Id. Assessing

the difficulty this issue presents, the court of appeals stressed that
this issue should not be resolved without a well-developed record
which identifies the "relevant scientific communities" and determines the degree of acceptance which those communities grant
Dr. Done's methodology. Id. at 955-56. The court emphasized
that the "ultimate touchstone" is "helpfulness to the trier of
fact." Id. at 956. Judge Stapleton also acknowledged that Rule
702 affords expert testimony a "presumption of helpfulness." Id.
The court of appeals concisely reiterated its primary concern:
The fact that a scientific community may require a particular
level of assurance for its own purposes before it will regard a
null hypothesis as disproved does not necessarily mean that an
expert opinion with somewhat less assurance is not sufficiently
reliable to be helpful in the context of civil litigation.
Id. at 957.
The court of appeals reminded the lower court that it must assess the dangers of admitting the testimony, even if it were labelled
reliable, before ultimately determining whether the evidence is
"helpful" and thus admissible under Downing. Id.
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After declining to exclude the evidence under the less than rigorous requirements of Rule 403, the court of appeals presented the
sufficiency of the evidence issue. Id. Judge Stapleton opined that
the lower court must determine New Jersey's burden of proof standard to determine whether the admissible evidence would bar summary judgment. Id. at 958-59. The court of appeals concluded by
reversing the lower court's grant of summary judgment because the
record was insufficient to sustain the exclusion of Dr. Done's testimony. Id. at 959.
While the DeLuca decision provides instructions on interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence and on the treatment of expert
testimony in Bendectin litigation, the significance of its instructions
is obscured because the strong suggestions of admissibility were
tempered by the court of appeals' unwillingness to formulate concrete parameters for reliability analysis under Rule 702. The court
of appeals underscored the consequences of its equivocation by reminding the lower court that its decision on remand will be entitled
to a "clear and erroneous" standard of review.
Nevertheless, certain indelible principles can be gleaned from
the DeLuca opinion. Although the Third Circuit did not flatly rule
that the epidemiological studies at issue were reliable for purposes
of Rule 703, it effectively guaranteed the prospect of dichotomous
treatment of epidemiological studies under Rule 703 found in the
First and D.C. Circuits, which provide that epidemiological studies
are reliable for Rule 703's purposes only for those who commission
them and unreliable for all others. The DeLuca court, in transferring
the discussion of methodology from Rule 703 to Rule 702, also
deftly sharpens the distinction between reliability of facts, data and
opinions, a Rule 703 issue, and the reliability of the methodology
used in interpreting data, a Rule 702 issue.
The court of appeals' decision comports with its previous decisions and the overall goal of the Federal Rules of Evidence to liberalize the rules of admissibility. See U.S. v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224
(3rd Cir. 1985)(rejecting the Frye general acceptance test for admissibility under Rule 702). The DeLuca decision reinforces the Third
Circuit's belief, originally presented in Downing, that admissibility
under Rule 702 should not hinge upon a court's ability to determine the consensus in the scientific community. Unfortunately, the
DeLuca decision, by clinging to the notion of expert reliability, also
shows the Third Circuit's continued unwillingness to formulate exact standards to govern the admissibility of expert opinions under
Rule 702. While the Third Circuit previously determined that Rule
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702 usually favors admissibility, see In re Japanese Electronics Antitrust
Litigation, 723 F.2d 238, 279 (1983), lower courts still lack definitive
standards to determine the reliability of expert testimony for the
purpose of admissibility. As Judge Stapleton's survey of case law
demonstrates, the circuit courts' discordant treatment of expert witness' testimony under Rules 702 and 703 ironically frustrates the
pretense of uniformity achieved for evidentiary rules under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The clearest approach simply would disregard reliability altogether and use relevance and helpfulness as the
delimitations for admissibility under Rule 702. See, e.g.,E. CLEARY,
McCormick on Evidence § 203, at 608 (1984).
By diminishing the impact of Rule 703 and retaining Downing's
reliability approach for Rule 702, the DeLuca decision continues the
incremental displacement of the causation issue from the court to
jury. This migration from judge to jury evokes all of the accompanying arguments associated with traditional distrust of jury theory.
More than one commentator has questioned the wisdom of relaxing
admissibility standards in an era where venality and availability of
experts exemplify the landscape of American litigation. See, e.g., Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Insuring
Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. of Ill. L. Rev. 43 (1986).
Driven by anxiety ofjury resolved issues, proponents of high admissibility standards, contend that a jury is easy prey for a lascivious
expert and a cunning lawyer. These fears may be especially wellfounded when liberalization of admissibility standards are coupled
with a jury's natural sympathy for a Bendectin victim, such as Amy
DeLuca.
Kyle C. Bisceglie

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Fifth Amendment-Separate Convictions for Continuing Criminal Enterprise and Its Lesser,
Predicate Offenses Does Not Violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause-United States v. Fernandez, 916 F.2d 125 (3d Cir.
1990).
On May 24, 1990 an order was entered by the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey whereby the defendant, Carlos Fernandez was convicted on several counts of con-
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spiracy. 916 F.2d at 125. Subsequent to a lengthy jury trial in
1985, the defendant was found guilty on Count one, conspiracy
to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1); Count two, conspiracy to import cocaine, 21 U.S.C.
§ 952 (a); Count three, knowingly engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise ("CCE"), 21 U.S.C. § 848; and Counts 10, 11, 12,
19 and 27, knowingly using a telephone in facilitating the conspiracy to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).
As a result of these convictions, the court sentenced Fernandez to 40 years imprisonment and a $300,000. fine. The final sentence was obtained through a framework of consecutive and
concurrent prison terms and fines which were imposed on the
various counts. The terms of the sentence were as follows. On
Count three, Fernandez was sentenced to forty years imprisonment and a $100,000. fine to run concurrently with an imprisonment term of twenty years on Count one. On Count two, the
court imposed a term of twenty years imprisonment to run concurrently with the Count three sentencing, but consecutively to
the Count one sentence. Further, on Counts one and two, Fernandez was fined an additional $100,000. Concerning each of the
five counts involving telephone conspiracy, the court sentenced
Fernandez to four consecutive years of imprisonment to run concurrently with the other sentences.
Although affirming the convictions, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, expressed concern over the formal terms of the court's sentencing. Id. at 125-26 (citing United
States v. Fernandez, 822 F.2d 382, 383 n.2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484

U.S. 963, (1987)). Because, however, the matter was not raised
on appeal, the court declined to address the issue and commented that it could be presented to the district court. Id. (citing
FED. R. CRIM. P. 35).
Consequently, Fernandez filed a motion requesting the district court, "to strike the convictions and sentences imposed as to
Count [one] and [two]." Id. In an unreported decision, the district court denied defendant's motion and rejected the defendant's argument that the conspiracy counts one and two represent
lesser included offenses of the CCE count. Id. The court suggested that the punishment attainable under the CCE count was
a cap on the general sentence imposed on the three main conspiracy counts. Id.
In the month following this decision, the defendant, with
new legal representation, petitioned the court for an "updated
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probation report." Id. In the request, Fernandez proffered that
he exhibited no expressions of contrition at the original sentencing, due to the "siege mentality in his defense." Id.
At resentencing, defense counsel advocated that Fernandez's good institutional adjustment merits the imposition of a
shorter sentence. Id. In rejecting the defendant's request for a
full scale institutional evaluation, the court contended that such
an investigation would produce evidence more relevant to parole
than resentencing. Id. Consequently the court ordered a sentence of forty years on Counts one through three and reduced
the original fine to $100,000. Id. The original sentences on the
five counts of telephone conspiracy were reimposed to run concurrently with the general sentence. Id. The standard employed
by the court in imposing the sentence was "[o]n the basis of the
facts, the record and the situation as it existed at the time of the
original sentence." Id.
On appeal before the Third Circuit, Fernandez presented
two issues. Id. The first issue before the court on plenary review
was whether the district court erred in not holding the sentences
on Counts one and two to be in violation of the "double jeopardy
proscription" and the fifth amendment due process preclusion
against cumulative punishment for Count three and the predicate
offenses. Id. Fernandez also asserted that the district court
abused its discretion in failing to obtain an updated presentence
report. Id.
Writing for the court, Justice Greenberg held that none of
the values underlying the double jeopardy protection are offended by permitting the three convictions to remain. Id. at 127.
The court reasoned that the convictions, which were limited by
the punishment allowable by law for the more serious CCE offense, resulted from a single trial. Id. Concerning the second issue, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's
refusal to obtain a new presentence report at resentencing. Id. at
129. Therefore, the Third Circuit affirmed the order entered by
the district court concerning the sentencing of Carlos Fernandez.
Id.
Justice Greenberg began the court's analysis by assessing the
defendant's contention that the case relied on by the district
court in resentencing was effectively overruled to the extent applicable by the decision in Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 105
S.Ct. 1668 (1985). Fernandez, 916 F.2d at 126. In rejecting this
argument, Justice Greenberg turned to the Third Circuit's inter-
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pretation of Ball in United States v. Grayson, 470 U.S. 856 (1985).
Fernandez, 916 F.2d at 127. The court noted that Grayson involved the conviction and sentencing of a defendant for drug
conspiracy pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 846 and his subsequent conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 848 for engaging in a CCE. Fernandez,
916 F.2d at 127. The court reiterated its decision that Grayson's
conviction on CCE could stand, but the sentence could not. Id.
Turning its attention to the present matter, the court
stressed that the CCE statute and the narcotics conspiracy statutes under which Fernandez was convicted serve different and
distinct purposes. Id. The court observed that the conspiracy
statutes seek to castigate illegal compacts to import and possess
cocaine with the intent to distribute. Id. The court, however,
maintained that the goals underlying the CCE statute, seek to
punish persons who traffic in illegal drugs "on a continuing,
widespread, substantial and supervisory basis." Id. (citing United
States v. Fernandez, 822 F.2d 382, 384 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 963, 108 S.Ct. 450 (1987)). The court concluded that there
was no indication in statutes or legislative history that Congress
did not intend to permit separate convictions to stand for the
conspiracy and CCE offenses." Id. at 127. Further, the court
pointed out the irrelevance of the fact that Grayson involved successive prosecutions while Fernandez's convictions were obtained at a single trial. Id. In fact, the court reasoned there was
no indication that the intention to allow separate convictions to
stand must be dependent on the time of conviction, trial or indictment. Id.
In further addressing Fernandez's double jeopardy claim,
the panel considered the three primary aims underlying double
jeopardy protection as enunciated in Aguilar. Id.(citing United States
v. Aguilar, 849 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1988)). The court acknowledged
that, "[i]t protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for
the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." Id. (quoting Aguilar, 849
F.2d at 96). The court asserted that the conviction and sentencing of Carlos Fernandez as provided by the district court in no
way offended these values. Id. at 127.
Next, the Third Circuit panel addressed the issue of whether
Fernandez would suffer any collateral consequences unless the
convictions on Counts one and two were vacated. Id. The court
considered United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d 621, 632-35 (2d Cir.
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1985), for the proposition that a single sentence could be imposed by combining the convictions without vacating the lesser
counts. Fernandez, 916 F.2d at 127. In Aiello, the Second Circuit
advocated that such a procedure would be essential in preventing
the defendant from suffering collateral consequences as long as
the conviction on the lesser count is not vacated. Id. Justice
Greenberg doubted this reasoning, questioning why collateral
consequences of lesser offense convictions should be a consideration, if congressional intent permitted both convictions to stand.
Id. Further, the court rejected the assertion that collateral consequences represent excessive punishment beyond that imposed at
the original sentencing. Id. The justices reasoned "[i]f there may
be collateral consequences after sentencing from a conviction for
a single offense, the double jeopardy clause is not violated if the
same consequences follow from a conviction for a predicate or
lesser offense which, though combined with a greater offense for
sentencing, is permitted to stand." Id.
Recognizing that its conclusion was in sharp contrast to the
ninth circuit reasoning, the court considered United States v. Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct.
3237 (1990). Fernandez, 916 F.2d at 127. Justice Greenberg acknowledged the Hernandez-Escarsega holding that congressional
intention did not permit cumulative punishment for section 848
CCE violations and the lesser section 846 conspiracy violations.
Id. The court noted that the Ninth Circuit required vacation of
the Counts one and two conspiracy violations of section 846. Id.
(citing Hernandez-Escarsega,886 F.2d at 1582). Justice Greenberg
rejected this "remedy," arguing that one general sentence limited by the punishment available under the greater offense is not
a cumulative punishment. Fernandez, 916 F.2d at 128-29. Further,
the court attacked the ninth circuit decision as tending to frustrate congressional intent as the double jeopardy clause does not
mandate the "remedial relief" requested. Id. at 129.
On the second issue presented, the court found no abuse of
discretion by the district court in declining to obtain a new
presentence report. Id. Since a presentence report existed at the
original sentencing stage and "the record [had] information sufficient to enable the meaningful exercise of sentencing discretion," the district court's procedure fully complied with
applicable procedure. Id. (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1)). Supporting its conclusion, the Fernandez Court stated that it is not an
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unusual practice to decline to obtain an additional presentence
report at resentencing. Id. at 129 n.5 (citation omitted).
The Fernandez decision represents a guiding light in an area
of law plagued with divergent interpretations. Notably, the
Third Circuit advocated the procedure of referring to congressional intent and the legislative history underlying violated statutes. The purposes sought to be achieved through a codificatio
of particular violations will necessarily impact on the sentencing
procedure employed. The court aptly recognized that because
the goals underlying the conspiracy statute and the continuing
criminal enterprise statute are different, the conspiracy violations
may not be deemed meaningless.
Further, the court adequately addressed the double jeopardy
argument advanced by the defendant. Fernandez provides illumination for subsequent courts as to the values inherent within the
double jeopardy protection. The Third Circuit enunciated the
rule that if there exists one general sentence, the length of which
is limited by the statutory maximum allowable under the more
serious offense, then there is no perversion of the double jeopardy concept. This procedure of "capping" the sentence will inevitably aid future sentencing courts when confronted with
allegations of double punishment and collateral consequences.
Moreover, the court limited Rule 35(a) and quashed the attempt
to expand the relief afforded thereunder.
Doreen Ann Yanik

CRIMINAL

LAW-EVIDENCE-ALTHOUGH

THE RELINQUISHMENT

OF AUDIO TAPES TO A PRIVATE TECHNICIAN FOR SOUND ENHANCEMENT DOES NOT MANDATE SUPPRESSION OF THE EVIDENCE,
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GOVERNMENT

MUST

OFFER

A

SATISFACTORY

EXPLANATION FOR UNDUE DELAY IN JUDICIALLY SEALING THE

EVIDENCE.-United

States v. Vastola, 915 F.2d 865 (3d Cir.

1990)
On March 15, 1985, the Federal District Court for the District of New Jersey authorized police interception of oral and wire
communications at the Video Warehouse in West Long Branch,
New Jersey, the alleged headquarters of a racketeering enterprise
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reputedly headed by appellants Gaetano Vastola and Elias Saka.
915 F.2d at 866. This surveillance authorization was extended
first on April 16, 1985 and again on May 14, 1985. Although the
second extension expired on June 13, 1985, all interceptions
ceased on May 31, 1985 upon discovery that the racketeering
headquarters were relocated to Neptune, New Jersey. During
this period, the police accumulated 185 reels of tape. The government, however, failed to have the tapes judicially sealed pursuant to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. Id. at
866-67 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2510-20).
On June 26, 1985 the district court authorized a second wire
interception at the Video Warehouse's new location in Neptune.
Although there is no controversy surrounding these communications, it was during this surveillance, datedJuly 15, 1985, that the
government presented the West Long Branch tapes for sealing.
Id. at 867. Subsequently, it was discovered that two of the West
Long Branch tapes were duplicates and had been accidentally
presented for sealing. The originals of the final two tapes were
sealed on August 19, 1985, after the district court had determined that a "satisfactory explanation" for the sealing delay had
been given.
The appellants brought a motion to suppress the tapes from
the West Long Branch surveillance based upon sealing delays of
45 days for 183 tapes and 80 days for the remaining 2 tapes.
Moreover, the appellants contended that the government violated the custody requirements of the Wiretap Act by sending
tapes to a private technician for audio enhancement.
In an unreported opinion, the district court held that suppression was not an available remedy. Id. at 868. Further, the
court determined that the release of the tapes to a private technician for audio enhancement was authorized by the Wiretap Act
because it was incident to trial preparation. Id. Finally, the district court concluded that because the physical integrity of the
evidence was maintained, the defendants were not prejudiced
and therefore, suppression was unnecessary. Id. at 868-69. The
district court did state, however, that it would reconsider the defendants' motion at trial if it was determined that the tapes had
been physically altered. Id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court because the enhancement process did not alter the content of the tapes and because
the legislature's intent to deter the tampering of evidence was
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maintained. Id. at 869. In United States v. Rios the United States
Supreme Court vacated the Third Circuit's judgment and remanded the case. Id. at 870. (citing Rios, 110 S.Ct. 1845 (1990)).
In Rios, the court interpreted the Wiretap Act to require suppression of surveillance tapes in cases where the government can not
provide a "satisfactory explanation" for a sealing delay. Id. (citing Rios, 110 S.Ct. at 1850, n.5.). In so ruling, the Rios Court
expressly rejected the holding of United States v. Falcone that such
evidence would be admissible, despite an unexplained sealing
delay, upon a showing of non-tampering. Id. (citingRios, 110 S.Ct
at 1850, citing Falcone, 505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 955 (1975)).
On remand, the Third Circuit divided its analysis into two
portions: the audio enhancement of the tapes and the sealing delay of the tapes. Id. at 871. The Third Circuit held that suppression is not warranted because Rios does not address situations in
which the government does not always retain custody of tapes
subsequent to unsealing. Id. The court reasoned that both the
Wiretap Act and Rios allow the government to counter a suppression motion with evidence of the tapes' authenticity and a satisfactory explanation. Id. at 872-73. The court articulated that the
government must prove that the handling of the tapes after their
unsealing did not alter their content and that the circumstances
requiring the unsealing were not created for "tactical gain" and
did not unduly prejudice the defendants. Id. at 873. Utilizing this
standard, the Third Circuit concluded that the government met
its burden by demonstrating that the enhancement process was
completed at the request of the defendants and could not have
been done "for tactical gain." Id.
The Third Circuit next addressed the issue of whether the
tapes secured from the West Long Branch surveillance must be
suppressed because of the delay in having them judicially sealed
in conformity with the Wiretap Act. Id. The court maintained
that the subsequent order for the surveillance of the Neptune location, dated June 26, 1985, could not serve as an extension of
the original West Long Branch order. Id. at 874. The court
noted that an application for the interception of communications
must set forth "a particular description of the nature and location
of the facilities from which or the place where the communication
is to be intercepted." Id. Additionally, the court stressed that
"the facilities from which, or the place where the wire, oral, or
electronic communications are to be intercepted are being used,
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or are about to be used, in the commission of [the] offense
[under investigation]." Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(d)). The
court explained that read together, these two sections reflect
congressional desire that wiretap orders and their extensions apply only to specific locations, thereby rejecting the government's
contention that the Neptune order effectively served as an extension of the West Long Branch order. Id. Moreover, the court
noted that the provision of the Wiretap Act allowing for roving
surveillance conflicts with other sections the Wiretap Act that require that the surveillance relate to particular locations. The
court opined that this inference logically flows from the statutory
language and that sections 2518(l)(b)(ii) and 2518(3)(d) do not
apply in cases where the prerequisites for roving surveillance are
met. Id. at 874-75.
The Third Circuit disregarded the government's explanation
for the delay-that it reasonably relied upon the Neptune order
as an extension of the original order. Id. at 875. The court, however, stated that on remand, an explanation could be offered to
the district court. Id. Moreover, the court stated that the district
court need not find a waiver of the explanation because the initial
response was made simultaneously with the government's request for a more extensive factual inquiry for the sealing delay.
Id. The court posited, however, that if the district court were to
permit a second explanation for the sealing delay, the government, at a formal hearing, must prove the actual cause of the delay. Id. at 876-77.
Finally, the Third Circuit, stated that it could have found
that the admission of the tapes was harmless error. The court,
however, refrained from doing so because if the district court
finds that the tapes should have been suppressed, the impact on
the government's case would be unascertainable. Id. at 877. The
court concluded that on remand, the district court must determine whether the surveillance tapes should have been suppressed. Id. If they find in the affirmative, the district court will
be faced with conducting a factual inquiry into the strength of the
remaining case proffered by the government.
In United States v. Vastola, the Third Circuit was forced into a
difficult predicament when its original decision was expressly
overturned. The court, however, succeeded, perhaps only temporarily, in not overturning the convictions of the defendants,
while establishing a new set of wiretap guidelines in conformity
with United States Supreme Court precedent. Although the han-
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dling procedures pronounced in the Wiretap Act are detailed,
the Third Circuit provided the government with wide latitude in
dealing with unsealed tapes. Therefore, the court was able to address both the need to protect individual rights and the need to
facilitate successful criminal investigations and convictions.
Jeffrey A. Bennett

